[DGD] Alternatives to the Kernel model of security...

[Greg Lewis]

On Wed, Jan 28, 2004 at 03:04:22AM -0800, Noah Gibbs wrote:
>   The problem with this, from my point of view, is
> tracking.  File permissions in Unix (and DOS, and to a
> lesser extent Mac) are pretty much like this.  But the
> problem is that there are non-DGD methods of file
> manipulation that must still be allowed...  Editing on
> the fly from a shell account is a non-optional feature
> IMHO.

A lot of the focus in this thread seems to be on files and
filesystems.  I'm wondering if this fundamental assumption
isn't flawed.  With DGD's persistent nature, you could easily
run into a situation where you decide to completely rearrange
the filesystem layout but want to keep existing objects.  In
this case, a permissions system based on filenames is going to
be a hindrance more than anything else as you'll have to make
some compromises to preserve the original object permissions.

I haven't looked into this myself, but it may be helpful to
look at the permission systems used in "cores" for drivers
like Cold or MOO, which DGD is arguably as closely related
to as it is to other LPMud drivers.  In this case, since the
only storage mechanism is persistent (a database), the
permission systems won't be file based at all.

Obviously this won't be a perfect fit, but it may provide some
insight.

-- 
Greg Lewis                          Email   : glewis at eyesbeyond.com
Eyes Beyond                         Web     : http://www.eyesbeyond.com
Information Technology              FreeBSD : glewis at FreeBSD.org

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