[DGD] Changing connect() (network package)

[Felix A. Croes]

bart at wotf.org wrote:

> > Not really.  You can let it log on to a special port that is only opened
> > on localhost and has its own connection protocol. 
>
> Making it obscure doesn't make it secure. Requiring a localhost connection
> isn't too helpful in a world where shared hosting is rather common for muds.
> limiting connections to localhost isn't a good enough security measure for
> database servers either.

A localhost connection ensures that attacks have to be local -- a rather
important qualification in a threat analysis.

It also has nothing whatsoever to do with "security through obscurity". :-)


> > Authentication could
> > be done using a one-time password (especially since there is no 
> > person, but a program on the other side) if you are especially 
> > concerned about security.
>
> One way or another, the external daemon will have to get that password and use
> it to authenticate at some point.

But as a one-time password, it cannot be re-used in an attack.


>[...]
> If you put a 3rd party in the middle, as is the case with an external
> connection daemon, you create a staging point for man in the middle attacks.

Then again, if you were to integrate this vulnerable external connection
daemon with DGD, DGD itself becomes a staging ground for attacks!  Another
score against the networking package.


> A direct connection that does not involve a 3rd party (the connection daemon)
> does not have this issue. 
>
> Sure, one can still 'snoop' a local connection in case of shared hosting, but
> encryption can cover that. 

Only local connections, not external ones?  Is this something particular
to Windows hosts?  In a Unix environment, only the super-user can snoop
connections (local or otherwise), in which case all bets are off.

Regards,
Dworkin